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rug development is 
indispensable to deal effectively 
with disease [1]. However, 
two dilemmas emerge from clinical 
research devoted to this goal. First, 
new drugs are the source of a huge 
economy ruled not by the standards of 
the medical profession, but by the rules 
of business and the market [2]. Second, 
although the testing and the medical 
community’s “blessing” of a new drug 
lie entirely in the hands of medical 
institutions, medical journals, and 
regulatory agencies [3], once the drug 
is approved the ruthless mechanisms 
of industry propaganda and commerce 
take over [4,5]. 
    The gains in health obtained by 
the advent of a new drug should 
always be considered according to 
the crucial concept of its cost–beneﬁ  t 
balance, and the beneﬁ  ts often fall 
far below the costs (either monetary 
or otherwise). Of course, patients and 
drug companies might have different 
feelings about the costs and beneﬁ  ts 
of a new drug: patients have high 
expectations that the drug will help 
them to recover their health, whereas 
companies rely mostly on statistical 
arguments to back up the superiority of 
their new drug over existing ones [2,3].
    Academic Medicine and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: 
An Uneasy Relationship
    The marriage between pharmaceutical 
companies and academic medicine at 
times becomes a love–hate relationship 
[4]. Nonetheless, it is an indissoluble 
link that has brought countless 
beneﬁ  ts to society [1], that is bound 
to continue, and that must surely be 
supported. But the medical profession, 
not the pharmaceutical companies, 
must ﬁ  nd a way to base the relationship 
upon the academic and ethical aims 
that guide the practice of medicine and 
the public interest. 
    Over the last few years, one scandal 
after another has shown how drug 
company marketing can distort 
prescribing patterns. The root of the 
problem seems to be simple: medical 
research sponsored by drug companies 
is a mixture of, on the one hand, 
impeccable scientiﬁ  c talent devoted 
to the well-being of society, and, on 
the other, marketing expectations on 
the side of the company sponsoring 
the research. Both actors are effective 
professionals, but their aims could not 
be more distant. In some instances 
sponsors control the trial design, 
interpretation of results, writing up of 
study results, and publication strategies. 
    A number of proposals have been 
put forward to reduce the inﬂ  uence 
of the pharmaceutical industry upon 
medical practice. These include 
the creation of an independent 
institution to oversee clinical testing 
of prescription drugs [5], strict 
regulation of drug marketing [6], and 
rigorous guidelines for publication of 
pharmaceutical research in scientiﬁ  c 
journals [3].
    My proposal to realign the 
relationship between clinicians and 
drug companies is simple and is based 
on a single premise. I propose that a 
third party, appointed by academic 
institutions, must be compulsorily 
placed between clinical researchers and 
drug companies so that all dialogue 
(scientiﬁ  c and monetary) must be 
made through this third party. The 
guarantors of this new proposal would 
be the scientiﬁ  c journals, where the 
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results of the research are intended to 
be published [7]. 
    A Proposal for a Collegiate 
Research Council
    I propose that a committee called a 
Collegiate Research Council (CRC) 
be jointly appointed by 10–12 leading 
academic institutions. This committee 
would be certiﬁ  ed by the appropriate 
health authorities (such as the United 
States Food and Drug Administration 
or equivalent agencies in other 
countries).
    The CRC would be the only 
recipient of a research protocol 
related to the clinical testing of a 
drug; the pharmaceutical company 
or contract research organization 
must submit the protocol to the CRC. 
The CRC would deﬁ  ne the costs of 
the project, including the salaries 
of the scientiﬁ  c staff involved and 
appropriate compensation for the 
institutional review boards and for the 
CRC [8]. The CRC would select the 
optimal investigators and institutions 
based on their expertise, prestige, 
and independence, and would offer 
them, without the participation of 
the pharmaceutical company, the 
opportunity to conduct the trial. In this 
way, the “sponsor” of the trial would 
be the CRC, not the pharmaceutical 
company. 
    The local institutional review boards 
(or ethics committees) would review 
and approve the trial protocol, just as 
they currently review protocols [8,9]. 
The investigators selected must be 
independent from both the CRC and 
the pharmaceutical company. When it 
came to ﬁ  nancial matters, the clinical 
researchers would deal only with 
the administrators appointed by the 
institution or the CRC (the researchers 
would not deal directly with the drug 
companies). 
    The CRC would monitor the 
randomization process; it could choose 
to hire autonomous experts to review 
the design of the trial. The results of 
the trial would be analyzed by the CRC 
prior to publication. These results 
would be made public, even if they 
were negative. The results of the trial 
would be written by the investigators 
with total independence and submitted 
for publication to an interested journal, 
acknowledging that the research was 
conducted according to the guidelines 
of the CRC.
  Beneﬁ  ts of the Proposal
    I believe that this regulatory proposal 
would prevent several biases and 
would improve the reliability of 
clinical studies, which would obviously 
be in the public interest. The natural 
reticence of the pharmaceutical 
industry to embrace this regulation 
would lessen with time, in my opinion, 
because the scholarly support for the 
reliability of any given trial would be 
greatly enhanced. In this way, it would 
be expected that accusations and 
lawsuits against drug companies would 
diminish because of the prestige of 
the collegiate boards that participate 
in the whole process of testing a 
drug before its eventual approval for 
marketing. This procedure would 
also enhance public conﬁ  dence in 
the scientiﬁ  c basis of novel drug 
treatments.
    Currently, the academic boards 
of any given institution review 
the ethical and methodological 
aspects of a research proposal. As 
expected, the protocols sponsored 
by pharmaceutical companies are 
usually adequate, as they are designed 
by experts hired by the industry [3]; 
therefore, the protocol is commonly 
approved by the respective boards. 
The problem does not lie in the 
design of trials, rather, in the very 
fact that the drug company pays the 
researcher directly. This payment 
changes the relationship from that of 
scientist and businessman to that of 
employer and employee, with all the 
characteristics and inequalities that 
this relationship entails. Currently, 
the investigator receives fees, grants, 
travel expenses, and other gifts from 
the company that owns the drug that 
is under investigation, generating 
in the investigator natural feelings 
of gratitude towards the generosity 
of the sponsor. The relationship 
creates unfavorable grounds for 
proper scientiﬁ  c evaluation, because 
it creates potential bias in the analysis 
of the trial results. The compulsory 
presence of the CRC would break this 
bond by introducing in the middle 
a reliable, well-meaning, highly 
respected and vigilant party between 
the drug company on one side and the 
investigator on the other side. 
    The proposed CRC would also 
prevent the drug company from having 
the power to decide whether or not 
the results of a trial will be published. 
Currently, many trials go unpublished 
(particularly negative trials) [10]. 
Patients must surely be informed about 
  all   clinical research, including negative 
results, relevant to a drug that they are 
going to take.
    Although difﬁ  cult to achieve, I 
also propose that the CRC should 
be informed about the intended 
price for the drug. This would allow 
the CRC to have a say on the crucial 
subject of the cost–beneﬁ  t balance, 
which nowadays is left solely in the 
hands of the drug manufacturers. I 
believe that the medical profession, 
which is accountable to society (not 
just to individual patients), should be 
more actively involved in monitoring 
the way in which drugs become 
commercialized—particularly given 
that it is clinical researchers and 
clinicians who will test and then 
prescribe them. The intervention of 
the medical profession in discussions 
of costs and beneﬁ  ts would likely have 
strong public support, particularly 
given that many new treatments are 
discovered through publicly funded 
research. It seems unfair that the price 
of a drug is currently set arbitrarily by 
the drug manufacturer, without the 
involvement of the medical community. 
Also, in contrast with the commercial 
trade of other goods, where prices 
are set by production costs and 
competition, in the peculiar case of 
pharmaceutical substances the price 
is not related to production costs or 
competition. Instead, drug companies 
justify the high prices of drugs on 
the weak argument of high “research 
costs,” an argument which has been so 
eloquently disputed by Marcia Angell 
in her book   The Truth about Drug 
Companies: How They Deceive Us and What 
to Do About It   [5].
  Conclusion
    Although this proposal is brief, it 
could serve as a draft for devising a 
more comprehensive mechanism of 
regulation headed by a CRC. The 
participation of the CRC would 
not represent a large economical 
investment nor an additional 
bureaucratic body to delay the testing 
of new drugs. Instead, I believe that it 
would   lower   the current spending by 
pharmaceutical companies on clinical 
trials and would accelerate the process 
of drug testing and drug approval on 
behalf of the patient.   
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